

**"Transforming to Where? The Cases of Egypt and Tunisia": 16th DGAP International Summer School; Berlin, August 26-September 7, 2012**

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16th DGAP International Summer School  
Berlin, August 26–September 7, 2012

## **“Transforming to Where? The Cases of Egypt and Tunisia”**

*by Maria Haimerl and Manuela Hager, Dina Fakoussa and Christian AchRAINER (eds.)*

## About the EU-Middle East Forum

The EU-Middle East Forum (EUMEF) is a dialogue and networking program for young and mid-level professionals from North Africa as well as Turkey and Europe. The Forum was created in 2011, and it conceptualizes and organizes policy workshops like the New Faces Conferences and International Summer Schools. Every two years, all alumni of the New Faces Conferences and Summer Schools come together for an alumni reunion in Berlin. The forum tackles and analyzes different political, economic, and social issues and developments in the Arab region and Turkey, and it gives critical scrutiny to German and EU responses and policies. EUMEF is the follow-up project of the International Forum on Strategic Thinking (2006–2010) and the Forum European Foreign and Security Policy (1997–2005).

## Acknowledgements

The EU-Middle East Forum would like to thank its partners for making the 16th DGAP International Summer School such a great success. We are especially grateful to the following institutions for their support:

Robert Bosch Stiftung



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i f a



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We would also like to thank the Office for the Federal Commissioner for Preserving the Record of the Ministry for State Security of the GDR (BStU), the German Bundestag, the German Federal Ministry of Defense, and the German Federal Foreign Office for their kind invitations.

We extend our most heartfelt gratitude to our rapporteur Maria Haimerl and to our intern and rapporteur Manuela Hager, whose dedication and efforts contributed substantially to the success of the summer school.

Last but not least, a special thanks to all DGAP staff for their unconditional help and support, without which the Summer School would not have been possible.

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# 16th DGAP International Summer School Berlin, August 26–September 7, 2012

## “Transforming to Where? The Cases of Egypt and Tunisia”

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### Foreword

Egypt and Tunisia have been witnessing radical transformations ever since presidents Hosni Mubarak and Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali were toppled. The countries have seen, among other changes, a remarkable awakening of public interest in politics and in shaping their own societies, an unprecedented flourishing of their political landscapes, and relatively free and fair, and hence historic, elections. However, as is to be expected, uncertainties prevail, and both countries are struggling hard with the complex steps of their respective transitional processes. They are encountering formidable challenges (although the degrees and dimensions of these challenges vary), such as the emergence of new powerful political actors with an Islamic reference system and an unpredictable and unclear agenda as regards their commitment to democratization; a society split along a secular-Islamist divide; and, correspondingly, a lack of consensus on the draft of a new constitution. A deteriorating and hence alarming socio-economic situation, an unwillingness to deal with atrocities committed in the past, a highly politicized judiciary, and a complex and opaque constellation of actors further complicate the situation.

Against this backdrop, DGAP's 16th International Summer School analyzed the status of the transitions in Egypt and Tunisia, highlighting achievements, failures, and the challenges ahead. Viewpoints and analyses were exchanged in intense debates, and possible solutions were developed. For example, new concepts, theories, and models of democracy were addressed. The quality of the political process, the agenda of dominant political actors, and socio-economic dimensions of the transitional phases and related policies were all equally scrutinized. The

Summer School also delved into other relevant subjects such as the issue of transitional justice, EU and German policies toward Egypt and Tunisia, new regional alliances and power shifts, and how other countries experienced their transitions from autocratic to more open and democratic systems, and whether lessons derived thereof are relevant for Egypt and Tunisia.

The Summer School gathered 29 promising students and graduates from Europe, Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco for ten days in Berlin. It offered participants a unique opportunity to experience a highly stimulating intellectual environment and to broaden their horizons by attending lectures, panel debates, working groups, and communication and argumentation workshops, and by engaging in Oxford-style debates. The Summer School aimed at offering a space for learning, fostering the exchange of knowledge and experience, and sensitizing participants to appropriate and effective policies, as well as for the development of joint solutions. Moreover, it allowed for an intercultural dialogue to increase understanding and trust between young potential policymakers from Arab countries, the EU, and Turkey. By exchanging views on political and societal developments and discourses in the respective countries, participants became sensitized to the interests and needs of different sides. And, finally, the Summer School supported a pluralistic, tolerant, and respectful debating environment, and enabled young professionals from various backgrounds to establish their first professional networks.

Dina Fakoussa  
Head of EUMEF



Dina Fakoussa and Christian Achrainer introduce the DGAP and EUMEF

## Program

### Monday, August 27

9:30–10:00	<p>Opening of the 16th International Summer School</p> <p>Amb. Paul Freiherr von Maltzahn (ret.), Executive Vice President, DGAP</p> <p>Christian Hänel, Deputy Head of Department, International Relations Western Europe, America, Turkey, Japan, India, Robert Bosch Stiftung</p> <p>Peter Mares, Director of zivik, Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations (ifa)</p>
10:00–11:00	<p>Introduction to EUMEF and the Conference</p> <p>Dina Fakoussa, Head of EUMEF</p> <p>Christian Achrainer, Program Officer of EUMEF</p>
11:30–13:00	<p>Getting to know DGAP: The Role of a German Think Tank</p> <p>Eberhard Sandschneider, Otto Wolff-Director of the Research Institute, DGAP</p>
13:00–14:00	Lunch at DGAP
14:00–19:00	Scavenger Hunt through Berlin
19:00	Dinner at DGAP





The participants get their first impression of the DGAP during the opening

## Tuesday, August 28

9:00–10:30	Preparation and Presentation of Scavenger Hunt Results
10:30–13:00	Democracy and Transformation: Approaches and Conceptual Remarks Paul Nolte, Professor of Modern and Contemporary History, Freie Universität Berlin
13:00–14:00	Lunch at DGAP
14:00–16:00	Islam and Democracy: The Struggle for Freedom and Tolerance Tariq Ramadan, Professor of Contemporary Islamic Studies and Research Fellow at St Antony's College, Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Oxford
17:00	Dinner at DGAP

## Wednesday, August 29

9:00–10:30	Between Religion and Politics: Development and Program of Islamist Forces in Egypt Hamed Abdel Samad, Writer and Expert on Islamic Studies and Movements in Egypt
11:00–17:30	Debating and Communication Workshop Dominic Hildebrand, German Debating Vice-Champion 2011 Christoph Krakowiak, Founder & Former President of Streitkultur Berlin e.V. Clemens Lechner, German Debating Champion 2011
17:30–19:00	Dinner at DGAP & Preparation of the Debate
19:00–20:30	Debate: The EU should place Values before Interests





The group during Tariq Ramadan's lecture

## Thursday, August 30

- |             |   |
|-------------|---|
| 9:00–10:30  | Options and Reforms for Egypt's and Tunisia's Economies in Transition<br>Ibrahim Saif, Resident Scholar at the Carnegie Middle East Center, Beirut  |
| 11:00–12:30 | Working Group Session: Preparation of the Debates   |
| 12:30–13:30 | Lunch at DGAP   |
| 13:30–15:00 | A New Era of Participation? Prospects and Challenges for Civil Society in new Pluralistic Systems<br>Mustafa Kamel Al-Sayyid, Professor of Political Science at Cairo University and Executive Director of Partners-for-Development for Research, Consulting, and Training, Cairo |
| 15:30–18:00 | Working Group Session: Preparation of the Debates   |
| 18:00       | Dinner at DGAP  |



Communication and debating skills were discussed during a workshop

### Friday, August 31

- |             |  |
|-------------|--|
| 9:00–10:30  | <p>Democratization in Eastern Europe: A First-hand Account from Poland<br/>         Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Former Polish Minister of Defense and Chairman of the Council of the Euro-Atlantic Association, Warsaw</p>  |
| 11:00–18:30 | <p>Working Group Session: Input Presentations<br/>         Working Group “External Actors,” Facilitator: Almut Möller, Head of the Alfred von Oppenheim Center for European Policy Studies, DGAP</p> <p>Working Group “Socio-Economic Reforms,” Facilitator: Inken Wiese, PhD Candidate and Consultant<br/>         Working Group “Political Islam,” Facilitator: Hoda Salah, Consultant and Analyst on Political and Cultural Matters in the Arab World</p> |
| 18:30       | <p>Dinner at DGAP</p>  |



The participants prepared for the debates in small working groups


## Sunday, September 2

- |             |   |
|-------------|---|
| 11:30–14:00 | Visit to the Reichstag, Seat of the German Parliament |
| 15:30–18:00 | Boat Trip on the Spree                                |

## Monday, September 3

- |             |  |
|-------------|--|
| 9:00–10:30  | Working Group Session: Preparation of the Debates  |
| 11:00–12:30 | Transitional Justice: Achievements and Obstacles of Dealing with the Past<br>Amine Ghali, Program Director at Al Kawakibi Democracy Transition Center, Tunis |
| 12:30–13:30 | Lunch at DGAP  |
| 15:00–17:00 | Visit to the Office of the Federal Commissioner for preserving the Records of the Ministry for State Security of the GDR (BStU)                              |
| 18:00–19:30 | Visit to Berliner Unterwelten e.V.   |





Inken Wiese facilitates one of the working groups

## Tuesday, September 4

9:00–10:15	Debate 1: Only a Secular State can be a Full-fledged Democratic State Working Group 1 vs. Working Group 2
10:15–11:30	Debate 2: Islamists' Sets of Beliefs are Irreconcilable with Democracy Working Group 3 vs. Working Group 4
11:45–13:00	Debate 3: Neo-liberal Policies Fail to achieve Social Justice. Winner Debate 1 vs. Winner Debate 2
13:00–14:00	Lunch at DGAP
14:00–16:30	Turkey and the Middle East: Deconstructing its Role and Influence Hüseyin Bağcı, Chairman of the Department of International Relations at the Middle East Technical University, Ankara  Perceptions of Turkey in the Middle East Jonathan Levack, Program Officer of the Foreign Policy Program, Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), Istanbul
17:00–18:30	The Geopolitical Implications of the Arab Transformations Volker Perthes, Director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin
18:30	Dinner at DGAP



Myriam Guetat from Tunisia poses a question

### Wednesday, September 5

10:30–12:00	<p>Visit to the Federal Ministry of Defense</p> <p>An Integrated Army: The German Bundeswehr between Parliament and NATO</p> <p>Colonel Thomas Hambach, Branch Chief "Representation of Germany's Political and Military Interests in NATO" at the Federal Ministry of Defense</p>
12:15–13:45	Lunch at the Ministry of Defense
14:30–18:00	Visit to the Federal Foreign Office
14:30–16:00	<p>Germany in the MENA Region: Interests versus Values</p> <p>Amb. Volkmar Wenzel, Personal Representative of the German Foreign Minister for the Arab World, Federal Foreign Office</p>
16:30–18:00	<p>EU Policies toward the MENA Region</p> <p>Annette Jünemann, Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, University of the Federal Armed Forces Hamburg</p>
19:00	Dinner at Max und Moritz, Oranienstraße 162, 10969 Berlin



AbdElGhany ElSokary from Egypt argues passionately during the debate

## Thursday, September 6

- |             |   |
|-------------|---|
| 09:00–10:30 | Civil-Military Relations in Post-revolutionary Settings: The Case of Indonesia<br>Aurel Croissant, Professor of Political Science and Vice Dean of Research at the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, Ruprecht-Karls-Universität, Heidelberg |
| 10.45–13:15 | Working Group Session: Preparation of the Debates   |
| 13:15–14:00 | Lunch at DGAP   |
| 14:00–15:15 | Debate 1: Democracy Promotion Should be Substituted by Further Pure Economic Cooperation<br>Working Group 1 vs. Working Group 2   |
| 15:15–16:30 | Debate 2: External Actors Should Use Military Force to Remove Despotic Regimes<br>Working Group 3 vs. Working Group 4   |
| 16:30–17:30 | Wrap-up Session, Feedback, Evaluation   |
| 20:00       | Farewell Party at Mauersegler, Bernauer Straße 63, 13355 Berlin   |



## Lectures and Speeches

The following pages provide a summary of each speaker's contribution in order of their appearance at DGAP's International Summer School.

### Paul Nolte

#### Democracy and Transformation:

#### Approaches and Conceptual Remarks

Nolte started his presentation by pointing out two contradictory developments: on the one hand, we are currently witnessing the triumph of democracy, exemplified by the Arab Spring, the Occupy movement or the Color Revolutions in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, we can also observe a growing disenchantment with democratic governance and politics in general. Many perceive the 21st century as an authoritarian age, in which countries like China are politically authoritarian, but economically successful. Accordingly, Nolte introduced two basic narratives about the state, development, and the future of democracy. The liberal narrative takes an optimistic stance and is based on the assumption that democracy is a universal value. While it is originally a Western concept, democracy can and should be applied and promoted worldwide. The liberal narrative predicts a democratic future and an expansive trajectory, domestically as well as globally. The leftist narrative on the contrary is characterized by a rather pessimistic viewpoint, predicting erosion and eventually the demise of democracy. It is rooted in political theory and assumes that democracy can only function in Western societies. Moreover, it highlights the flawed state of democracy in the West, mainly due to the contradictory nature of capitalism and democracy.

Nolte took a critical stance on both views and argued that following only one of those narratives was too simplistic. As an alternative, he introduced a multidimensional approach that regards the history of democracy as a story of fulfillment, but also of trial and error, crisis, and struggle. He argued that many features of today's democracies, such as parliaments and elections, could be traced back to the 18th century. Despite some differences, basic features of these institutions have remained largely unchanged. At the same time, over the last 200 years many societal experiments have failed, socialism being the most significant example. Democracy witnessed several crises, for example in the 1920s and 1930s. According to Nolte, democracy is not a fixed model, but has constantly been subject to change and evolution. From 1945 onwards for instance, it was defined mainly as a competitive electoral regime. After the experience of fascism in Germany, the *zeitgeist* was shaped by profound

distrust of popular rule and political competition was seen as the main feature of a democratic system. In the 1950s and 1960s, participation became a decisive element. New modes of governance evolved and civilian actors and social movements became more and more involved in the decision-making process; action based purely on self-interest gave way to advocacy policies.

In the post-Cold War period, the world seemingly witnessed the climax of democratization, and many assumed that the competition between democracy and dictatorship had been resolved once and for all. Yet this view proved to be too limited and failed to take into account that democracy had again changed since the 1970s. Developments such as the emergence of service and consumer economies, a rapidly globalizing world, the fragmentation of political organization, the rise of socioeconomic inequalities, and a communication revolution had severe consequences for the state of democracy. The most striking ramification in that respect was probably the increasing critique of authorities and an anti-institutional leaning in societies worldwide. Against this backdrop, Nolte concluded that classical democracy was currently transforming into "multiple democracy," which is multi-level in character. In this new era of democratic governance, traditional institutions such as elections or parliaments remain important, while new layers and modes are introduced and become additional core elements of democracy.

In the subsequent discussion, some participants argued that Nolte's historical account expressed a very Western perspective. In response, he encouraged participants to elaborate on their own countries' experiences, and admitted that it might be necessary to include other analytical categories. The issue of promoting democracy was also subject of controversy. One participant raised



Paul Nolte spoke on democracy and transformation



the question of why, when there was a decline of trust in democratic institutions in the West, the very same kind of institutions were built up in developing countries. Nolte agreed that trust was declining, but argued that the picture was more complex than surveys would suggest. According to him, people had a negative and critical view, but this did not mean that they wanted to abandon democratic institutions. To illustrate this assessment, he referred to the euphoria about Barack Obama or the new German president Joachim Gauck as examples that people were still supportive of democratic institutions and their representatives, despite being more critical.

### **Tariq Ramadan**

#### **Islam and Democracy:**

#### **The Struggle for Freedom and Tolerance**

At the beginning of his lecture, Ramadan pointed out that it was essential to deal with questions of terminology and definition before discussing specific phenomena. Accordingly, he started his presentation by outlining his understanding of democracy, which includes six principles: rule of law, equal citizenship, universal suffrage, accountability, separation of powers, and separation of the state from any other powerful entity (not only religion but also the economy, etc.). These six principles should be promoted universally, but have to take differing contexts into account when applied.

To illustrate that democratic models have historical roots and may differ from one another, Ramadan elaborated on contradictory connotations of the term "secularism." The Western experience with secularism was fundamentally different from the experiences of most Arabs, and hence, historical understandings differ. Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt both imposed secularism on their peoples and used it to uphold their authoritarian rule. In Europe, in contrast, the introduction of secularism went hand-in-hand with an increase in political and social freedoms, as it was part of the democratization process. Thus in Western societies, secularism is mainly associated with democracy, while in most Arab societies it is connected to authoritarian rule. Against this backdrop, Ramadan predicted that religious references would likely play a role in the prospective political systems of the region. This, however, would not mean that the states will be undemocratic, only that that particular context requires such a model of democratic governance.

To analyze a specific context, four dimensions have to be taken into account: political structure, religion, culture, and economy. Only by examining all these dimensions can current developments in the region and

resistance to certain models or concepts be fully understood. To illustrate his argument, Ramadan focused on the cultural dimension and its relation to citizenship. He emphasized that citizenship would be one of the core issues in the current transitional period, but not only in the meaning of an official status. Rather citizenship should also encompass the feeling of being an equal citizen who is accepted and integrated in society. In this context, he referred to the situation of European Muslims. While they possess full citizenship and abide by the law, they still face exclusion and are not part of the common national narrative in many European societies. Ramadan claimed that a truly inclusive democratic society should not only provide equal rights, but also share the same narrative to create a sense of belonging, going beyond merely tolerating certain segments of society. This is essential for Western democracies as well as for the newly emerging systems in Egypt and Tunisia.

A lively discussion evolved after the presentation. In particular, possible models of democracy for Egypt and Tunisia were discussed controversially. Ramadan highlighted that such systems would have to be indigenous. One can refer to experiences in other countries, but a critical stance should be taken and people should be skeptical toward certain models. In many Western countries, for example, economic decision-making is very exclusive and not transparent. Moreover, ethics should play a more important role in politics than is the case in the West. Therefore, reforms and Western institutions must not simply be copied. Rather, context-sensitive and all-encompassing transformational reforms should be pursued, making reference to all four dimensions and all six democratic principles. In his concluding remarks, referring to the inclusive common narrative again, Ramadan introduced three 'L's which are prerequisites for becoming a good citizen: abiding by the law, speaking the language of the country of residence as a pre-condition for freedom and, most importantly, loyalty.



Tariq Ramadan answers questions from the audience

## Hamed Abdel Samad

### Between Religion and Politics:

#### Development and Program of Islamist Forces in Egypt

At the beginning of his lecture, Hamed Abdel Samad introduced the general political setting in Egypt, which used to be a "three-card game" consisting of the military, Islamist movements, and the left. The military began to dominate more and more after the overthrow of King Farouk I in 1952. While the Muslim Brotherhood first supported the coup, it eventually turned against the military regime and Nasser, leading to the imprisonment of many Brothers on the one hand, and the participation of the left in government, on the other hand. The setting changed again under Sadat, who turned toward the West and was opposed by both leftists and Nasserists. As a result, many leftists were imprisoned whereas several Brothers were released and the government began engaging with them. The formation of the liberal movement in the last few years can be seen as the emergence of a fourth player.

Abdel Samad pointed out that there had always been a political agenda behind the actions of the Muslim Brotherhood, which constantly tried to increase its influence by supporting different actors. Currently, the Brotherhood and the military seem to be collaborating, at least in the background. Earlier, a strong rivalry between the two players existed, which was, in Abdel Samad's view, not necessarily desirable, but did guarantee a balance between religious and secular actors. The fact that this balance is disappearing might have severe consequences for the constitution writing process. Samad argued, that this could become an acid test for the movement, as the Brothers would have to prove that they were seriously committed to the democratic process.

The January 2011 uprisings took the Brotherhood by surprise. Although they had been demanding change for decades, they did not take part in the demonstrations during the first days, leaving many revolutionaries disappointed. Nevertheless, the Islamists turned out to be the

group that profited most from the toppling of Mubarak. Together with the Salafists they won almost 70 percent of seats in the first post-Mubarak parliament. Subsequently, the movement lost considerable support. This became clear in the first round of presidential elections, in which Mohamed Morsi garnered only 25 percent of the votes. According to Abdel Samad, one reason for that was the fact that the media was still in the hands of the old regime. He portrayed the Brotherhood members in parliament as laughable figures. But more importantly, the Brotherhood is struggling to manage the transition from being in the opposition to being the ruling party. They made several mistakes and in consequence disappointed many Egyptians. He argued that it was quite easy to oppose Mubarak and become active in those realms where the regime had failed, such as taking care of poor people and providing education and healthcare. Now that the Islamists are in power however, they are responsible for ruling the whole country and have to develop concrete policies. This also necessitates increased pragmatism, which in turn creates tensions between the ideology of the Islamists and their political actions.

According to Abdel Samad, the elections functioned as a Trojan horse for the movement, which sneaked to power in order to destroy the system from within. The Brothers made several attempts to create a "deep state" or infiltrate the state; this is sometimes described as the "brotherhoodization" of Egypt. On the other hand, political power has also led the Islamists into the trap of having to reveal their own contradictions.

Abdel Samad does not believe it is the Brotherhood's goal to establish a theocratic state. Although the movement has been preaching that "Islam is the solution" for decades, he stressed that during elections, the Brothers chose the slogan "We bring goodness to Egypt." This again, Abdel Samad explained, exemplifies their pragmatism, as they are very well aware that the majority of Egyptians does not support the idea of an Islamic state. The Iranian model is not a fitting scenario for Egypt's future for two reasons. First, Egypt lacks a clerical system connecting religion and the state and second, Egypt does not have significant oil reserves. This makes Egypt heavily dependent on the West, as the Egyptian economy is based on export, tourism, and foreign investment.

In conclusion, Abdel Samad pointed out that the Islamists were not a monolithic bloc, but consisted of very diverse groups. Apart from the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafist parties emerged as political actors after the revolution. As both represent political Islam and claim to speak in the name of God, he pointed out that they are



Hamed Abdel Samad during his lecture

rivals in the political arena and compete for voters. While the Brotherhood distances itself from the conservative Salafists in order not to scare off foreign investors, it profited from Salafist mobilization in favor of Morsi and has used the opponent to portray itself as a representative of moderate Islamism. However, the meaning of this is very vague. So far, the Muslim Brotherhood has appeared immature when it comes to its political agenda and has hardly been able to explain the contents and goals of its Renaissance Project.

### Ibrahim Saif

#### Options and Reforms for

#### Egypt's and Tunisia's Economies in Transition

Ibrahim Saif started his lecture by providing a historical account of economic developments in the region. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Arab countries went through a transition from Arab socialism to economic liberalism. After public spending could no longer be sustained, the countries increasingly depended on aid from international financial institutions, and therefore faced reform demands. Accordingly, transition was not based on an ideological paradigm shift, but can rather be described as a survival strategy. The reforms were opposed by large segments of the population, as the consequences, such as the collapse of the social security system, were tremendous. Nevertheless, they were enforced by the oppressive regimes and strong security apparatuses. While reforms entailed (limited) economic liberalization, they did not encompass political liberalization. This led to the rise of new business elites, as former state monopolies were privatized. These new elites quickly established alliances with the ruling regimes.

Turning to an analysis of the current situation, Saif suggested that a classification of the countries of the MENA region based solely on the availability of natural resources was insufficient. He argued that resources as well as institutional capacities should be taken into consideration because only these two features together could provide reliable information about prospective economic developments. Saif noted that most Arab countries showed weak economic performance and had large budget deficits, with governments relying on popular policies like subsidies and public spending. But oppositional actors often also lack an economic vision. Islamist agendas, for example, often entail conflicting messages regarding economic policies. The private sector can currently be described as hesitant, and searching for its new role and position.

Most Arab countries affected by the uprisings, first and foremost Egypt and Tunisia, experienced a steep decline of their GDP in 2011. Due to the instable situation, foreign investment came to a halt, unemployment rates rose, and many governments in the region increased expenditures for subsidies, transfers, wages, and salaries in light of the protests. Foreign reserves also declined tremendously.

Defining priorities in order to move forward, Saif stressed the importance of political and therewith economic stability, and of reducing uncertainties. Moreover, governmental intervention should be limited and fiscal space created by restructuring subsidies and establishing greater policy consistency. He emphasized that this was especially important as it would send positive signals to the private sector as well as to the public. Furthermore, Saif argued, that corruption had to be stamped out, the rule of law enforced, and all important stakeholders – the private sector, NGOs, and the public at large – must be included in the reform process. Even though Saif spoke mainly of worrying developments, he also highlighted some positive effects of the uprisings. For instance, decision-making processes would be less exclusive in the future, as people were no longer willing to accept elitist decisions made behind closed doors. Due to the emergence of a free media and social media networks, former taboos such as corruption could be tackled more openly.

In the discussion, participants mentioned one important aspect which Saif did not elaborate on: regional disparities. Referring to the example of Tunisia, one participant argued that it was essential to prospective economic development to address regional disparities. Also, the role of the BRIC states – Brazil, Russia, India, and China – in the region was discussed. Saif argued that Chinese investments were generally appreciated and that all of the BRIC states increasingly sought opportunities in the region, thereby competing with Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia or Qatar.



Ibrahim Saif delivered his talk via Skype



## Mustafa Kamel Al Sayyid

### A New Era of Participation? Prospects and Challenges for Civil Society in new Pluralistic Systems

At the outset of his presentation, Mustapha Kamel Al-Sayyid emphasized that the term "civil society" was one of the most controversial concepts in the social sciences. This is illustrated by the fact that every philosophical and political school of thought uses its own definition. However, all agree on three basic conditions, which are necessary for the establishment of a civil society: autonomy from the state, respect for the freedom of association, and, most importantly, acceptance of the right to dissent. There is less consensus on whom to subsume under the term civil society. According to Al-Sayyid, the concept encompasses a great variety of actors, including class-based organizations of propertied classes or workers, professional associations, non-government organizations, neo-traditional institutions such as churches or mosques, and communication institutions like the media. New social movements and internet groups such as "We are all Khaled Said" have to be regarded as civil society actors as well. In Egypt, one can even include judges, as they have been very active in defending civil and political rights.

Elaborating on the situation before the revolution, Al-Sayyid described civil society as having been under siege: trade unions were under governmental control, elections in professional associations suspended, and human rights organizations harassed on a regular basis. In the 2000s, important developments took place as new social movements like Kifaya as well as different internet groups arose. With the uprisings, the situation changed fundamentally. Restrictions on civil society activities were removed, the number of NGOs rocketed, new independent trade unions emerged, and formerly banned organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood or the Salafists resurfaced. Al-Sayyid described these developments as the most important implications of the revolution. At the same time, an informal "uncivil" society has

emerged, which applies methods like blocking roads or raiding offices to underpin their demands for services or the reduction of prices.

Subsequently, Al-Sayyid confronted participants with several dilemmas and questions concerning the future development and legal regulation of civil society in Egypt. It is, for example, open to debate whether all groups should be allowed to become involved in politics or whether the state should assign civil society spokespersons. The question of foreign funding, too, was discussed controversially in public debates. Al-Sayyid pointed out that this had already been a sensitive issue under Mubarak and was crucial for the military as well as for the Islamists. Both prefer funding through governmental channels, as this enables them to control distribution. Al-Sayyid argued that foreign donors would surely oppose such regimentation.

Asked for the reasons why so many people were critical of certain NGOs, Al-Sayyid stressed that only NGOs active in the area of human rights were unpopular. This can be explained by the fact that many Egyptians regard the concept of human rights as an element of Western intervention in the Islamic world and as being opposed to the teachings of Islam. In this context, it is important to look at the role of the government, which has portrayed human rights NGOs as pursuing a foreign agenda, with staff interested only in their own benefit and personal enrichment.

## Janusz Onyszkiewicz

### Democratization in Eastern Europe: A First-hand Account from Poland

Janusz Onyszkiewicz portrayed Poland's history as one of constant struggle against conquest and occupation by external actors. This tradition of resorting to violent means of gaining freedom and independence changed in the 1970s and 1980s as a reaction to different historical events, for example the trauma of the Warsaw Uprising, which resulted in the total destruction of the Polish capital by German forces, or the Prague Spring, which ended in a violent crackdown by Soviet forces. These events led Polish intellectuals and different societal groups to believe that political change would have to come from within society and through peaceful means.

However, oppositional groups were fragmented at first. In 1970, they managed to join forces and established a civic committee in 1976. Its members tried to find a legal framework under which a peaceful protest could be organized, circumventing possible prohibition by the communist authorities. They found a legal loophole in the Polish



Mustafa Kamel Al-Sayyid emphasized the role of civil society

adoption of an International Labour Organization (ILO) convention. The convention allowed for the establishment of trade unions, which rapidly gained experience and developed stable organizational structures. Over time, the well-known trade union Solidarnosc became more active and increasingly politicized, with a member base that quickly rose to almost ten million. Facing the increasing power and influence of Solidarnosc, the government introduced martial law in 1981 and the movement was driven underground, but could not be annihilated completely. On the contrary, the union became increasingly active in underground activities.

Over the years it became clear that the imposition of martial law could neither defuse growing social unrest nor diminish the trade union's societal and political influence. Realising this, government authorities offered to negotiate with the movement in 1988. A round table with members of the government, Solidarnosc, and other oppositional groups was established. Solidarnosc followed a rather "self-limited approach," as Onyszkiewicz defined it, and accepted a change from a totalitarian to an autocratic regime, which offered only certain basic freedoms. At the same time, there were hopes among the union's representatives that these limited freedoms would induce a more profound process of change. During the negotiations, the government offered Solidarnosc a kind of power-sharing by introducing the division of seats in parliament between the government and Solidarnosc, reserving 65 percent of seats for the government and 35 percent for the union. However, the Solidarnosc negotiators demanded that the 35 percent should be offered to anyone, so that at least those seats would be filled through free elections. This was accepted, and elections took place in June 1990. Solidarnosc won all 35 percent of the seats. Eventually, in December 1990, Lech Walesa was elected president of Poland. These elections resulted in an overall change in the political atmosphere, and with Glasnost and Perestroika

happening in the USSR at the same time, the end of communism in Poland was sealed.

The subsequent discussion mainly focussed on the problem of establishing a stable but pluralistic political system. Onyszkiewicz referred to his own experience of being in Tahrir square, where he did not know whom to talk to. For him, this illustrates one of the major problems of the Egyptian opposition, which does not stand united and lacks political leadership. He stressed that it had been fundamental in Poland that forces had stood united against the regime. Additionally, he alluded to the importance of Lech Walesa's charisma and his ability to gather forces behind himself. Asked how minds and culture can become more democratic, Onyszkiewicz explained that Poland had been a democratic country for over eight hundred years; even under the monarchy there had been elections. This culture still existed when the revolution took place, even though Poland had been under foreign occupation and communist rule. As a second important factor, he mentioned Poland's continuous link with Western Europe, which had also existed under communist rule. Regarding participants' questions on the issues of lustration and transitional justice, Onyszkiewicz advised that people in Tunisia and Egypt should offer political space for certain old guards of the regime, because a stable and peaceful political system cannot be achieved otherwise. He again referred to experiences in Poland, where old communist elites were offered a place in the new system.

### Amine Ghali

#### Transitional Justice:

#### Achievements and Obstacles in Dealing with the Past

Amine Ghali defined transitional justice as an informal set of rules and mechanisms put in place after a civil war, severe human rights violations, or the transition from an authoritarian regime to democratic rule. He described it as a country's attempt to tackle the legacy of its past in order to write a better future. Although this definition is very vague and the boundaries of the concept remain flexible, there are four commonly accepted components or steps which must be taken in order to meet the requirements of transitional justice.

The first and most difficult component is the process through which a society agrees upon a shared truth of what has happened. In order to bring together not only the victims' but also the perpetrators' truth, a participatory approach is required. According to Ghali, this is best done through a truth-finding commission, as established in South Africa in 1995 or in Morocco in 2004. The second component is accountability, which Ghali described as



Janusz Onyszkiewicz discusses the democratization process in Poland

the question of who decides how people have to pay for what they did. This step requires a judiciary approach that is complementary to the classical judiciary system of the country. In Tunisia, for example, violence broke out in different regions during the revolution. These events must be studied and judged comprehensively and independently by one institution instead of leaving every district to decide. The third step is reparation, which entails more than the fiscal aspect of the term, Ghali emphasized. For example, for a family who lost a son due to having been tortured in prison, it can be significant if his name appears on a memorial or if the head of state names him as a victim of the regime. Not only individual, but also collective means of reparation must be found in cases where whole villages or ethnic groups suffered from repression or were marginalized. Fourthly, institutional reform is necessary to guarantee that such events can never be repeated. Reforming security institutions is particularly important, but one of the most difficult tasks to master. Including the former cadre is the main challenge in this regard, because exclusion could lead to the formation of militias, gangs, etc. In Tunisia, the transitional justice process started on the first day after the revolution with the establishment of three commissions: The Higher Political Reform Commission, responsible for revisiting the law, the National Commission to Investigate Human Rights, and the National Commission to Investigate Corruption and Embezzlement. Ghali stressed that tackling not only civil and political but also economic and social rights is a novelty. He illustrated the importance of economic and social rights by referring to the example of South Africa, where black and white citizens were granted equal political rights after Apartheid, but still do not enjoy the same economic rights. The majority of unemployed people living in impoverished districts are still black. In this respect, the transitional justice process in South Africa can be regarded as failed. Noting that a lack of resources is the main challenge in terms of grant-

ing equal economic rights and decreasing unemployment rates, Ghali stressed the importance of finding innovative and affordable solutions such as complementary trainings for unemployed graduates.

At first, the Tunisian public was critical of these commissions and the majority rejected them. The commission against corruption in particular was attacked frequently, as its investigations concerned businessmen, the media, and judges. But after seeing the first results, Tunisians slowly began to see the usefulness of its work. According to Ghali, civil society actors should support this process by acknowledging and promoting the general idea of transitional justice, as well as publicizing the work and results of the commissions, and becoming engaged in capacity building by training politicians, judges, lawyers, etc. In addition, transitional justice needs political weight and acknowledgment. In the case of Tunisia, this was achieved by two major decisions: codifying the process of transitional justice, Art. 24 of the interim constitution and the establishment of a Ministry of Transitional Justice.

During the discussion, Ghali emphasized that the process of transitional justice must be initiated from the bottom-up rather than top-down. It is decisive to assess the feelings and concerns of the public in order to launch necessary steps. Before writing a comprehensive law, several questions have to be discussed publicly: who will be held responsible? Which acts and atrocities should be investigated? To what extent should members and supporters of the former regime be excluded from or reintegrated into the new political system? Emphasizing that transitional justice remains a very sensitive approach entailing legal aspects, human agency, and a great deal of politics, Ghali warned that it must not become a partisan process. He believes that the main challenge in Tunisia is preventing Ennahda from taking certain elements out of the transitional justice framework and using it for its own benefit. Reparations for victims, for example, appears to some to be a means of paying back Ennahda's own people, because reparations are paid mainly to Islamists who suffered from the authoritarian regime.



The participants take notes during Amine Ghali's presentation

#### **Jonathan Levack**

Perceptions of Turkey in the Middle East

#### **Hüseyin Bağcı**

Turkey and the Middle East: Deconstructing its Role and Influence

Turkey's role in the emerging new order in the Middle East was discussed by Jonathan Levack and Hüseyin Bağcı. While Levack presented a survey of perceptions of Turkey in the Arab countries, Bağcı described and re-



viewed Turkey's role from a Turkish perspective, referring mainly to political leaders' opinions and statements.

Levack presented a survey conducted annually by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TES-EV). In 2011, about 250,000 people from 16 Arab countries were interviewed for the third time. To start with, Levack pointed out that Turkey garnered approval from 78 percent of those surveyed, making it the most popular country among people in the Middle East, ranking before other regional powers such as Egypt or Saudi Arabia. However, there are major differences among regions and countries. The North African states going through a transition process, including Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, generally expressed a more positive view. This can be explained by the fact that Turkey's open support for change was well received by respondents. In Syria in contrast, Turkey's response to the conflict seems to have triggered a negative reaction. Compared to 93 percent in 2010, only 44 percent of Syrians had a favorable opinion of Turkey in 2011.

In general, people perceived Turkey's role positively with regards to its beneficial impact on peace in the region. Most respondents stated that Turkey had become more influential and that it should play an even greater role in the region, 61 percent regarded Turkey as the most-discussed role model. In this regard, Levack emphasized that Turkey was a country which offered "something to everyone." While some perceived it as a successful example of the compatibility of Islam and democracy, others described its economy, its secular political system, the role of the military, or its strategic value as exemplary. However, civil society actors and journalists in particular also expressed concerns. For instance, some respondents argued that Turkey was not clear enough about its objectives and interests in the region. Its neutrality was also questioned frequently, as Turkey is increasingly perceived as a purely Sunni power and statements by the Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoğlu defining Turkey as a state that "establishes an order" generated criticism. Additionally, Levack pointed to a lack of knowledge about the region among Turkey's political elites, challenging its potential role in the Middle East. At the same time, he noticed changes in this regard, as more and more young people are learning Arabic. Of special importance regarding the extent to which Turkey is seen as a model is the democratization process in the country. In that respect, the discussion about a new Turkish constitution was seen positively. On the other hand, there are several developments, especially regarding certain rights and freedoms, which raise concerns about Turkey's democratization process.

Turning to a Turkish view, Bağcı argued that Turkish politicians saw the Arab uprisings as a chance for Arab and Turkish people to re-converge. To illustrate this view, he mentioned Foreign Minister Davutoğlu, who expressed a strong belief in a "common destiny." To reach rapprochement, Bağcı stressed the importance of developing mutual understanding. Positively in this regard, he also observed that more and more young Turks were learning Arabic. Furthermore, an increasing number of Turkish publications, such as *Insight Turkey*, are now published in Arabic as well. These and other developments could potentially lead to a better common understanding. However, analyzing statements by politicians from different Arab countries, Bağcı claimed that no Arab politician had ever spoken of a common destiny. From this observation he derived that relations between Turkey and the Arab countries could be defined as a "one-sided love."

This final statement was challenged by several participants during the discussion. The fact that there are great differences among Arab countries was highlighted, questioning the binary view of Turkish–Arab relations expressed by Bağcı. Thereby, they referred to the results of the survey, which showed similar trends, but at the same time great differences among the diverse range of countries in the Arab world. Concerning democratization problems in Turkey, as pointed out by Levack, the Kurdish issue in Turkey was hotly debated. Many participants stressed that Turkey's policy in this regard could not be considered exemplary.

### Volker Perthes

#### [The Geopolitical Implications of the Arab Transformations](#)

At the beginning of his lecture, Volker Perthes reminded his audience that it was in fact too early to talk about geopolitical implications, as transformations in the region had just begun and were long-term processes. Only after one or two decades could impacts possibly be evaluated.



Jonathan Levack and Hüseyin Bağcı lectured on Turkey's role in the Middle East



Moreover, he accentuated that geopolitical implications were always rooted in societies and analyses often ignored how socio-economic factors were intrinsically related to geopolitics. The young generation that initiated the uprisings in the Arab world is better educated but has fewer opportunities than previous generations. According to Perthes, this will be decisive in the upcoming years, e.g. with regards to Saudi Arabia and other resource-abundant countries. In addition, the different readings of political Islam have geopolitical implications and will influence political developments in the region. For instance, Egyptian and Turkish interpretations have to be differentiated from the strict interpretations in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

Subsequently, Perthes proceeded with traditional geopolitical topics. Firstly, he elaborated on the emerging power struggle between several rising and declining regional powers. According to him, Turkey is in a promising position and might eventually be one of the winners. Syria and Iraq are neutralized because of civil war and Egypt is recovering only very slowly, trying to play a role in order to preserve its own status, but limited by internal instability. Saudi Arabia will not be able to hinder change in the Arab world and might face severe internal unrest itself in the near future, while Iran is busy trying not to admit that it is gradually losing influence. Thereafter, Perthes discussed geopolitical implications of and on local struggles. In Syria, for instance, an originally domestic conflict has expanded into a regional conflict in which different actors are trying to influence the course of events. As a third focal point, Perthes highlighted the implications of a "sense of insecurity": different actors are currently engaging in a discourse about a potential war, talking about "avoiding," "winning," or "not being able to avoid" a war. This "war talk," he warned, was very risky as it entailed the danger of being put into practice.

In his concluding remarks, Perthes stressed that simplistic views on geopolitical implications were seriously

flawed. He argued that the world was more complicated than the simple binary divisions often applied in geopolitical analyses. It would be wrong, for example, to argue that Iran is generally at odds with Western positions, as there are common interests in Afghanistan. The same could be said for Saudi Arabia, which is often defined as a friend and partner of the West, but at the same time finances Salafists in Egypt. Referring to these dualities in the subsequent discussion, Perthes reasoned that the only line that could be drawn after the Arab uprisings was between the forces of change and the forces of the status quo.

During the Q&A session, several issues and questions about different actors and states were raised. Regarding Russia's role in Syria, Perthes stressed the importance of mitigating Russian fears that Syria could serve as a model for Chechnya. Qatar, Perthes argued, could influence groups and political processes, but it could not dictate political outcomes or buy local politics. Referring to the theory of small states, he reasoned that small states like Qatar frequently overestimated their own role. Asked about the causal relation between oil and stability in the case of Saudi Arabia, Perthes critically reflected on the rentier state paradigm, which would unravel when new local and independent elites tried to change economic structures. He stated that as the case of Libya shows, oil cannot ensure the survival of a system if legitimacy is lost. In the face of limited resources and socio-economic changes, it will become more and more apparent that even the Gulf monarchies cannot bribe people – as the rentier state approach suggests – in the long run. Furthermore, confessional minorities cannot be deprived of citizenship forever, as Bahrain illustrates. Elaborating on increasing anti-Americanism in the region, Perthes analyzed Obama's Cairo speech, which managed to change polls and raise hopes in the region, but ended in serious disappointments. At the same time, Perthes emphasized, American soft power was still omnipresent: people still want to study at American universities and buy American products.

### Colonel Thomas Hambach

*An Integrated Army: The German Bundeswehr between Parliament and NATO (held during a visit to the German Federal Ministry of Defense)*

In his introductory remarks, Colonel Thomas Hambach explained that World War II and the Holocaust were still decisive for the Bundeswehr's (German armed forces) self-conception as well as German society's perceptions and opinions of military interventions. In light of this



Volker Perthes elaborated on the geopolitical implications of the transformations underway in the Arab World

historical background, the German Bundeswehr became a parliamentary army, which means that every deployment of German soldiers outside Germany necessitates a parliamentary mandate. This turned out to be an important principle for generating democratic legitimacy for military interventions.

Only since the 1990s has the Bundeswehr started to engage in military operations. This can be traced back not only to new security challenges after the end of the Cold War, but must also be seen in the context of German reunification. A reunited Germany induced new expectations regarding Germany's role and responsibilities among its partners in multinational security organizations. After operations in Macedonia, Cambodia, and Somalia, German forces were involved in the Balkan wars, which was an extremely contentious issue among the public. Afghanistan has become the most disputed intervention by the Bundeswehr so far. In this case, Colonel Hambach argued, the importance of parliamentary control became apparent; broad parliamentary backing provided the Bundeswehr with the legitimacy it needed to engage in this difficult intervention, which was important in light of great resistance among the population.

Turning to the Bundeswehr's integration into NATO, Colonel Hambach explained that NATO was the main pillar of German security policy. Proceeding to the topical issue of Libya, he argued that Germany had apparently missed the point at which positions had changed among its allies toward a positive stance on a military intervention. However, while German forces were not directly involved, they still participated in the intervention, as a fixed contingent of German soldiers is integrated in NATO's command structures. Although many other NATO members also did not participate in the intervention, Germany's non-engagement attracted particular international attention. Colonel Hambach explained this by again pointing to changed international expectations.

In the discussion, Colonel Hambach was asked whether there had been resistance within the military regarding the introduction of parliamentary control. He replied that parliamentary approval was very important to the armed forces, as they were usually as split as society over the issue of intervention. They therefore relied on the decision of democratically elected representatives, which provided legitimacy. The participants also showed great interest in the structure of the army and the recent abolishment of conscription. Colonel Hambach explained that the Bundeswehr in general was in favor of employing conscripts. Yet after the political decision to limit the period

of service from nine to six months, the leadership of the Bundeswehr saw no possibility of sustaining the system. Taking a critical stance toward the decision-making process in this regard, Colonel Hambach concluded that the decision had been made too fast, without taking potential consequences sufficiently into account.

Lastly, the intervention in Libya was discussed. Participants wanted to know whether Colonel Hambach perceived the German government's decision to not engage in the intervention as a mistake. He answered that it had not been a false decision, because there had been very valid reasons and arguments for it. However, he stressed that more communication with Germany's allies about future potential interventions was necessary and more factors should be taken into account. At the same time, he highlighted the importance of showing restraint with regards to military interventions.

#### Volkmar Wenzel

*Germany in the MENA Region: Interests versus Values (held during a visit to the German Federal Foreign Office)*

Volkmar Wenzel commenced his talk with remarks about how Germans generally perceived themselves at an international level. Referring to an opinion poll conducted after Germany's reunification, he outlined that most people had wanted Germany to not get more involved in international politics. They preferred a neutral role, with Germany as the "biggest Switzerland in the world" or a "reluctant big power" as Wenzel pictured it. This self-perception is still visible in German foreign policy.

Wenzel stressed that Germany's economic interests in the region were insignificant, as Germany was an exporting nation and only 2.5 percent of its exports went to the region. In Wenzel's view, Germany's main concern is Israel's security, which will be of continuing importance. The special relationship between Germany and Israel is mainly an element of the historical legacy of the Holocaust. According to Wenzel, this does not mean that Germany cannot criticize the Israeli government for its policies which, in his opinion, happens frequently at a bilateral level. Additionally, Germany also has close ties with the Palestinians, not least because of Germany's own experience as a non-sovereign or occupied state. Hence, he argued, Germans knew very well how important the right to self-determination was. In addition to Israel's security, Wenzel stressed that security in a broader sense was also in Germany's interest, including the fight against terrorism, humanitarian problems, and refugees and migration.

Turning to the role Germany and its European partners might play in light of recent developments, Wenzel first emphasized the self-responsibility of the Middle Eastern countries and their elites. He admitted that the colonial past and the drawing of artificial borders in the region have had tremendous consequences on developments in the countries, but nevertheless it would be misleading to assume that the West could decisively influence developments in the region. Yet Germany and the EU would be willing to help, whereby engagement could not consist mainly of financial aid, not least because of the current financial crisis. Currently, the European public could hardly be convinced to send large sums to countries in the region. Therefore, the political will of the countries' elites to develop the rule of law and restructure their economies were much more important than financial aid from the West.

In the discussion, participants mainly challenged Wenzel's argument that Germany had no interests in the region. Moreover, they took a critical stance toward his claim that the West did not have a significant influence on prospective developments and showed interest in EU-Mediterranean economic relations. In response, Wenzel outlined the necessity of the countries finding an economic niche through which to enter global value chains, at the same time admitting that the EU had to support economic development in the region, for example by opening its agricultural market. Wenzel concluded that it would need ambition and courage from both sides to manage the challenges of the current transformation processes.

### Annette Jünemann

#### EU Policies toward the MENA Region

(held during a visit to the German Federal Foreign Office)

Annette Jünemann began by alluding to the EU's failures in the Mediterranean region before the Arab uprisings started in 2011. The EU's policies, she argued, had been based on three problematic assumptions. First, many politicians and academics shared the assessment that authoritarian regimes were inherently stable. Second, Islamists were seen as the only proper oppositional forces, but mainly perceived as a threat, and, third, as a result of cultural prejudices it was believed that no civil society existed in the region. The uprisings not only proved that these assumptions were fundamentally wrong, they also posed a serious dilemma for the EU, as it had established relations neither with any Islamists nor with civil society actors. Moreover, the former rhetoric of the EU, which presented itself as a normative power while collaborating with dictators, could not be sustained and the obvious

moral double standards resulted in embarrassment and a diminishing of the EU's credibility.

Subsequently, Jünemann provided participants with different theoretical frameworks to analyze and explain EU policies toward the region. The first common approach, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), introduced in 1995, had been based on the democratic peace theory. However, it soon became apparent that the instruments and programs did not work as desired. With the failure of the EMP, and triggered by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a paradigm shift took place and securitization became the new theoretical framework. Securitization's basic premise is that any phenomenon, whether or not originally framed as a matter of security, can be transformed into a security threat and hence be perceived completely differently.

Illustrating this shift, Jünemann argued that with 9/11, human rights and democracy, which had been, at least in the rhetoric, emphasized within the framework of the EMP, became second-tier issues in later initiatives. Even though the EU was aware of human rights violations in several countries, it no longer placed these issues on the agenda, assuming that it would jeopardize the autocrats' cooperation in fighting the perceived "Islamic threat." As a second example, Jünemann elaborated on migration. The constant framing of migration as a security threat has resulted in a very problematic situation in which dead migrants and refugees at the borders of Europe are no longer scandalized in public. Rather they are still perceived as a threat to European security, and incidents are categorized as "natural disasters."

Turning to current developments at the policy level, Jünemann examined the extent to which the EU had learned its lessons. Referring to the policy documents published by the EU since the beginning of the uprisings, she noticed certain positive developments, as these documents indicate a willingness to change certain policies. For instance, the term democracy, barely mentioned in former publications, and positive as well as negative conditionality have gained renewed prominence. Civil society, a long neglected actor, is now integrated in the cooperation framework. Amongst other initiatives, the EU is fostering civil society in the European Endowment for Democracy.

However, looking forward, Jünemann questioned whether the EU was capable of implementing its stated aims and measures. She stressed that the EU's "logics of action" were instead "logics of persistence," with the security paradigm serving as the continuing leitmotif. The current euro crisis, which Jünemann characterized

as a crisis of the EU as a whole, has engendered a re-nationalization process that makes a paradigmatic shift even more unlikely. Additionally, one should be skeptical due to the institutional difficulties of the EU, which still does not have a fully comprehensive common foreign and security policy.

In her concluding remarks, Jünemann referred to possible measures which could be taken by the EU. She stressed that the EU should give up its regional approach and develop bilateral strategies with every country. Furthermore, she emphasized the importance of supporting civil society and acting modestly. Above all, Europe should avoid acting like a teacher when offering help.

In the subsequent discussion, participants elaborated mainly on the securitization framework and the support for civil society. They widely agreed with Jünemann on problematic consequences of the security paradigm and expressed doubt concerning the ability to overcome this paradigm, which depends on domestic politics and touches upon social perceptions. With regards to migration, one participant added that there were great differences among European countries. Spain, Italy, and Greece were more or less left alone by their northern partners, which did not see themselves as bearing any responsibility for the refugees, reflecting again an inherent problem of the EU itself. Participants took a critical stance toward the EU's civil society support, questioning the idea of a European Endowment for Democracy. They also pointed out that the EU faced great difficulties, as it had to start from scratch in its cooperation with civil society actors and to intensify and diversify its cooperation. Civil society actors had been neglected by the EU for too many years or suffered tremendously from the usual-suspects-syndrome.

### **Aurel Croissant**

#### **Civil-Military Relations in Post-Revolutionary Settings: The Case of Indonesia**

According to Aurel Croissant, among political scientists it is currently very popular to compare the cases of Indonesia and Egypt in terms of post-revolutionary civil-military relations (CMR). Since President Gen Suharto was forced to step down by a wave of mass protests in 1998, which meant the breakdown of the New Order regime after 33 years of dictatorship, CMR in Indonesia has been somewhat successful. Although prospects for democratic and civilian control over the armed forces (TNI) did not seem very promising due to the country's severe economic and security situation as well as the military's entrenchment in the economic and political system, Indonesia has managed to politically sideline its military, which nowadays

has no significant influence over the formation of government, parliamentary politics or national policymaking.

Croissant pointed out that reforming CMR was primarily about institutionalizing civilian control over the military and about democratic governance in the security sector. As a gradual and multi-dimensional concept, civilian control encompasses five decision-making areas: elite recruitment, public policy, internal security, national defense, and military organization. The outcome of CMR reforms is determined by human agency and by pre-existing structural resources that civilians can make use of to develop efficient strategies (e.g. certain values, political institutions, socio-economic structures or international factors). In addition, historical factors of CMR have to be taken into account. After the war of liberation in 1945-49, the military installed a decentralized structure and built a powerful independent business complex. In 1965, Major Gen Suharto led a counter-coup, which led to the establishment of the New Order regime. At first a major player, the military later evolved into a junior partner and instrument of the regime.

CMR after the revolution in Indonesia evolved in three stages. The first reform initiative came in 1999 from the military itself and was supported by the executive as well as by civil society. Explaining that military leaders were above all interested in the internal and institutional coherence of the military, Croissant pointed out that they had been supporting reforms, because the instrumentalization of the military by the New Order regime had threatened this very unity. Hence, willingness to reform within the military partly depends on how the authoritarian regime deals with its armed forces. If an authoritarian regime faces a severe crisis, the chance that the military will retract support in order to rescue itself is very high. Noting that departure from the regime does not necessarily mean that the military will support democracy, Croissant emphasized the role of civil society to push forward the democratic process. During the second phase, starting in 2000, the presidential system was turned into a parliamentary system of government and in 2004 the institutionalization process was finished with only limited adjustments. Since then, reforms have shifted from the military to the intelligence and police sector, as these realms had been neglected so far.

Subsequently, Croissant listed several prerequisites and steps for reforming CMR: 1) The police and the military have to be separated institutionally; 2) A Ministry of Defense has to be established; 3) Civil society must make strong demands for reform (in Indonesia, for example, the TNI's political actions were delegitimized by civil soci-



ety's focus on human rights violations by the military); 4) The elite has to agree to civilian demands in order to stabilize the democratic process; 5) Violent domestic conflicts have to be reduced.

Concluding that authoritarian institutional legacies strongly affect CMR in post-transitional or revolutionary settings, Croissant stressed that these factors influenced the leverage of civilians over the military and provided opportunities for civilian leadership. However, they do not determine the outcomes of reforms in post-authoritarian CMR. Furthermore, he pointed out that political entrepreneurship is crucial, and civilians need to take advantage of opportunities and resources and use them to develop appropriate strategies for dealing with the military. Indonesia's experiences suggest that recruitment and promotion policies, divide-and-conquer strategies in order to support those parts of the military which are in favor of reform, civilian acquiescence, and the legitimization of civilian control are the most crucial elements in what may be labeled creative and shifting combinations of soft and robust control strategies. Moreover, Indonesia placed peace before social justice, because in return for the military's support of the reform process, no military officer has been charged or put on trial for committing human rights violations. This opportunistic approach, as Croissant labeled it, has helped to stabilize the country. However, other countries will have to decide for themselves whether this is a smart strategy to adopt in their cases.

Croissant also explained that institutionalizing civilian control ultimately depends on domestic governments, institutions, and civilian actors but that it is necessary to reach a consensus between political parties on forcing the military out of the political sphere and on not seeking the armed force's support for their respective party interests. In the case of Egypt, civil consensus might be difficult to reach, because the military has enjoyed strong legitimacy since the 1950s, and has built a state within the state. In addition, creating civil consensus in Egypt, which is ruled by one dominant party, might be more difficult than in Indonesia, where there is no dominant party in parliament, but six to seven parties of similar size. Therefore, Aurel Croissant suggested bringing together different civil society actors who can foster consensus for CMR through capacity building and campaigns that shed light on military and defense policy. When comparing CMR in Egypt and Indonesia, one crucial difference must not be forgotten. Whereas the TNI did not play an active role during the breakdown of the authoritarian regime and the subsequent transition phase, the Egyptian armed forces have been a very important actor during and after the revolution. As Croissant suggested, CMR in Egypt might at the moment gain more from not being reformed, because the current situation guarantees a form of stability in the country.



Participants during the discussion

## Biographies of Speakers

(in order of appearance in the program)

### Paul Nolte (GERMANY)



Paul Nolte has been a professor of modern and contemporary history at Frei Universität Berlin since 2005. Prior to that, Nolte was an assistant professor in Bielefeld, a German Kennedy Memorial Fellow at Harvard University, and a fellow of the Wissenschaftskolleg (Institute for

Advanced Study) in Berlin. From 2001 to 2005, he joined the International University Bremen and was a visiting professor of European history at the University of North Carolina in 2010–11. He was a senior fellow at Historisches Kolleg in Munich in 2012–13. Nolte has published widely on German and American social, political, and intellectual history of the 19th and 20th centuries, with an emphasis on social movements, social thought, and political ideology. Several of his books have stimulated debates in a wider public, including *Generation Reform* (2004), and Nolte frequently comments on current political and social affairs in the media. His most recent book, *Was ist Demokratie? Geschichte und Gegenwart*, a history and critical analysis of democracy, appeared in March 2012 with the publisher C.H. Beck.

### Tariq Ramadan (UK)



Tariq Ramadan is a professor of contemporary Islamic studies at Oxford University (Oriental Institute, St Antony's College) and teaches at the Oxford Faculty of Theology. He is a visiting professor at the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Doha, senior research fellow at Doshisha Uni-

versity in Kyoto, and director of the Research Centre of Islamic Legislation and Ethics (CILE) in Doha. Moreover, he is president of the European Muslim Network (EMN) in Brussels. Through his writings and lectures, Ramadan has substantially contributed to the debates on the situation of Muslims in the West and on Islamic revival in the Muslim world. He is active at academic as well as grassroots levels, lecturing extensively throughout the world on theology, ethics, social justice, ecology, and interfaith as well as intercultural dialogue. Ramadan holds an MA

in philosophy and French literature and a PhD in Arabic and Islamic studies from the University of Geneva. In Cairo he received one-on-one intensive training in classic Islamic scholarship from Al-Azhar University scholars (*ijazat* in seven disciplines). His book *The Arab Awakening: Islam and the New Middle East* was published with Penguin in April 2012.

### Hamed Abdel Samad (EGYPT/GERMANY)



Hamed Abdel Samad is a German-Egyptian political scientist and writer. He worked for UNESCO, at the Institute of Islamic Studies at the University of Erfurt, and at the department of Jewish history and culture at the University of Munich. He studied literature and political

science in Egypt, Germany, and Japan. Abdel Samad became known through his biography titled *Mein Abschied vom Himmel* (My Departure from Heaven), and his book *Der Untergang der islamischen Welt* (The Decay of the Islamic World) has been translated into Arabic, Persian, and Dutch. During the uprising at the end of January 2011, he went to Cairo in order to join the revolutionaries and publicly called for President Mubarak's resignation. In his book *Krieg oder Frieden: Die arabische Revolution und die Zukunft des Westens* (War or Peace: The Arab Revolution and the Future of the West), Samad analyzes the triggers and courses of the Arab revolutions and outlines the future of the Middle East.

### Ibrahim Saif (LEBANON)



Ibrahim Saif is a resident scholar at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut. As an economist specializing in the political economy of the Middle East, his research focuses on economies in transition, international trade with an emphasis on Jordan and the Middle East,

institutional governance, and labor-market economics. In addition to his work at Carnegie, Saif serves as a consultant for numerous international organizations, including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the International Labor Organization. He is also a fellow with the Economic Research Forum and a member of the Global Development Network. Prior to joining Carnegie, Saif was the director of the Center for Strategic Studies at

the University of Jordan and, until recently, served as the secretary general of the Economic and Social Council in Jordan. His recent projects have focused on the political economy of the Euro-Med Association agreement and the oil boom in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. In addition, Saif has taught at both the University of London and Yale University, where he led courses on the economies of the Middle East.

#### Mustafa Kamel Al-Sayyid (EGYPT)



Mustapha Kamel Al-Sayyid has been teaching political science at Cairo University and the American University in Cairo since 1982 and is the executive director of Partners-in-Development for Research, Consulting, and Training, a think tank devoted to issues of development.

He spent one year as a visiting scholar at the University of California in Los Angeles and one semester at the Harvard University Law School. He has also held leading positions in both the Egyptian Human Rights Organization and the Arab Political Science Association, served as a member of the Committee on Global Security and Cooperation of the US Social Science Research Council, and worked as a visiting fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for two months in 2002. He led the core team that prepared the original version of the Arab Human Development Report of 2009 and served as director of the Center for the Study of Developing Countries at Cairo University from April 1995 until November 2004. Al Sayyid's main research focus is on questions of political economy, human rights, and civil society. He was educated in Egypt and Switzerland and earned his PhD from the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva in 1979.

#### Janusz Onyszkiewicz (POLAND)



Janusz Onyszkiewicz is a former Polish minister of defense (1991–93 and 1997–2000) and became a member of the Polish democratic opposition in the mid-1960s. In 1968 he was active in strikes and demonstrations for freedom of speech and research, and was one of the

organizers of the Solidarity trade union in the Warsaw region in 1980 as well as its national spokesman (until

1989) and a member of the national executive (Presidium). After 13 December 1981, he was imprisoned for more than one year and thereafter rearrested several times. Onyszkiewicz was the spokesman of the Solidarity delegation to round table negotiations with the communist authorities (February–April 1989), member of the Polish parliament from 1989–2001, and chairman of the Polish delegation to the WEU and NATO parliamentary assemblies. He is a member of the party Union for Freedom and acted as its president between 2006 and 2009. Moreover, he was member and vice-president of the European parliament from 2004 to 2009. Currently he is, among others, the president of the council of the Euro-Atlantic Association in Poland and adviser to the minister of defense.

#### Amine Ghali (TUNISIA)



Amine Ghali has been program director of the Al Kawakibi Democracy Transition Center (KADEM) since 2008, which is working on issues of democracy, reform, and transition in the Arab region – with activities and initiatives in more than ten Arab countries. Currently

he focuses his contribution on the transition process in Tunisia, especially on political reform, elections, and transitional justice issues. He is also a member of the National Commission to Investigate Corruption and since May 2012 also a member of the National Commission on the Transitional Justice Debate. Before joining KADEM, he worked for a number of regional and international NGOs such as Freedom House and the Center for Arab Women Training and Research (CAWTAR). Ghali holds an MA in international development law from the University René Decarte in Sorbonne and a BA in international management from the University of Houston. He has taken part in a number of special courses and training programs in human rights and democratization.

#### Hüseyin Bağcı (TURKEY)



Hüseyin Bağcı is a professor of international relations at Middle East Technical University in Ankara and the chair of the Department of International Relations since October 2011. He is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London and the



Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels. Moreover, Bağcı is deputy director of the Foreign Policy Institute in Ankara. He visited the DGAP in Bonn as a guest researcher and was senior fellow at the Center for European Integration Studies (ZEI) in Bonn. Moreover, he acted as visiting professor at the University of Bonn in 2007, at the University of Rome La Sapienza in 2007, at the University of Lublin in 2008, and at Humboldt Universität in Berlin in 2010–11. Bağcı has published several books and a large number of articles on Turkish foreign policy and Turkish-German relations and is widely quoted by the national and international press. He received his PhD in political science from the Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität in Bonn in 1998.

#### Jonathan Levack (TURKEY)



Jonathan Levack has been program officer at the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation's (TESEV) Foreign Policy Program since 2009. In his role, he mainly deals with projects on the Middle East, including TESEV's annual Turkey and the Middle East public opinion

survey. Levack also oversees the program's other activities, dealing with topics such as Turkey-Armenia relations, transatlantic relations, Cyprus, and Europe. He published on several topics ranging from Turkish foreign policy, the Middle East, and energy to emerging markets. Levack was educated at the University of London, from where he obtained an MA, and the University of Bath.

#### Volker Perthes (GERMANY)



Volker Perthes has been director and executive chairman of the board of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin since 2005. He is also a professor and lectures at Humboldt Universität and Freie Universität in Berlin. Previously,

he was assistant professor at the American University in Beirut and head of the research division Middle East and Africa at SWP. Perthes is one of the leading German analysts and commentators on developments in the Middle East and has published widely on several aspects of the Arab uprisings. He is frequently quoted by the German media. Perthes studied political science, history, oriental

languages, and literature in Duisburg, Bochum, and Damascus. He earned his PhD at Duisburg University in 1990 and earned his Habilitation from Duisburg University in 1999 focusing on regional politics and political systems in the Middle East.

#### Colonel Thomas Hambach (GERMANY)



Colonel Thomas Hambach has been branch chief of "Representation of Germany's Political and Military Interests in NATO" at the Federal Ministry of Defense in Berlin since 2008. After joining the German air force in 1981, he was promoted to colonel in 2006. During his career,

he has held several key positions within the armed forces as well as the Federal Ministry of Defense. Among others positions, Colonel Hambach acted as military assistant to the chief of the general staff at the Federal Ministry of Defense, as desk officer responsible for Asia within the branch "PolMil Principles & Bilateral Relations" and as commanding officer for the Technical Group Recce Wing 51. He received the silver as well as the gold cross of honor of the German armed forces (Bundeswehr).

#### Ambassador Volkmar Wenzel (GERMANY)



Volkmar Wenzel is a German diplomat and currently acts as personal representative of the German foreign minister for the Arab world. A specialist on the Middle East, he has held several key positions within the Federal Foreign Office as well as in the region. He served, among

other things, as ambassador to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Riyadh, ambassador to the Arab Republic of Syria in Damascus, political counsellor at the German embassy in Cairo, attaché for scientific cooperation at the German embassy in Paris, and desk officer at the Department for Cultural and Press Affairs and Relief for Refugees at the German embassy in Khartoum. During his postings at the Federal Foreign Office, he acted as head of the department Dialogue with the Islamic World, deputy head of the department Maghreb and Middle East, and desk officer at the Department of Security Policy and NATO.

**Annette Jünemann (GERMANY)**

Annette Jünemann is a professor of political science and international relations at Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, University of the Federal Armed Forces in Hamburg. Her research mainly focuses on international relations, European foreign relations, European policies in the

Mediterranean, and democratization. Prior to moving to Hamburg, she was associate professor of political science at the University of the German Armed Forces in Munich and at the University of Kassel as well as visiting professor in the European Studies Program at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok. Jünemann was also a research fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP). She received her doctorate from the University of Hamburg in 1993 and her habilitation at the University of Kassel in 2000.

**Aurel Croissant (GERMANY)**

Aurel Croissant is a professor of comparative politics and political theory at Ruprecht-Karls-Universität in Heidelberg. From 2004 until 2006 he was assistant professor in the department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey. He holds a PhD

in political science from the University of Mainz (2001). His main research interests include the comparative analysis of democracy and autocracy, civil-military relations, political violence, and Asian politics. He has published more than twenty monographs, edited volumes, and special issues of German and international journals, and over 150 book chapters and journal articles. He is co-editor of the book series *Politics in Africa, Asia, and Latin America* (VS Verlag) and *World Regions in Transition* (Nomos), and edits (with Jeff Haynes) the journal *Democratization* (Taylor & Francis). He sits on the editorial boards of the *Asian Journal of Political Science* as well as the *Journal of Contemporary Southeast Asian Affairs*, and is member of the academic advisory boards of the Sustainable Governance Indicators (SGI) and the Bertelsmann Transformation-Index (BTI).

## Biographies of Participants

(in alphabetical order)

### Ahmed Mahmoud Mohamed Abolwafa Abdelgaffar (EGYPT)



Ahmed Mahmoud Mohamed Abolwafa Abdelgaffar is a student at the Faculty of Medicine at Cairo University, a political activist, and member of the party Strong Egypt. Before joining Strong Egypt, he supported the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) but because he as-

essed that the youth is hardly represented in the party, he withdrew his support. Ahmed has also been volunteering for several projects like the HIV/AIDS awareness raising project RED and different outreach programs for poor people. Moreover, he worked as data coordinator for the Men-awel-elsatr website for reproductive health and as a coordinator for the World Health Campaign in Cairo. Recently, he launched a program aiming at lowering the HIV/Aids rates in Malaysia.

### Nadim Abillama (LEBANON/FRANCE)



Nadim Abillama studied political science at the American University of Beirut, from where he graduated with a BA in 2010. In 2011 he earned his MA in international relations from IE Business School in Madrid, with a master thesis on Euro-Mediterranean relations in light of

the Arab uprisings. Following this, Nadim interned at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's Middle East Center in Beirut and the Public Information Office at the United Nations Relief and Works Agency in Beirut.

### Meryem Akabouch (MOROCCO/ITALY)



Meryem Akabouch is currently enrolled in a PhD-program in political theory at LUISS Guido Carli University in Rome. The focus of her research project is on the recent rise of Islamism in North Africa. She completed her bachelor's degree in French studies at Sidi Moham-

med Ben Abdellah University and earned an MA in international relations and diplomacy from Al Akhawayn University in Ifrane. In January 2011, she moved to Rome, where she earned a second master's degree in peacekeeping and security studies from Roma Tre University, with a dissertation on the threat of radical Islamism in Morocco. Meryem gained work experience as an intern at the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, as an office manager at the Department of French Studies at the University of Fes, and as an office coordinator at the Hillary Clinton Center for Women Empowerment and the Office of International Programs of Al Akhawayn University.

### Nazife Al (TURKEY)



Nazife Al is currently pursuing her MA degree in international relations at the Middle East Technical University in Ankara and is working as deputy secretary general of the Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM), an Istanbul-

based think tank with a focus on Turkey's foreign and security policy, international economics, energy, and climate change. She received her BA degree in international relations from Istanbul Bilgi University in 2010. During her studies, she spent one semester at the London Metropolitan University with the Erasmus Mobility Program. Moreover, she worked as student assistant for a summer program in Istanbul of Northwestern University, Chicago. Nazife attended a Model United Nations conference in New York in 2010 as the head delegate of the Istanbul Bilgi University team.

### Abdelrahman Ayyash (EGYPT)



Abdelrahman Ayyash is a political researcher and activist, specialized in political Islam. He studied computer engineering at Mansoura University. As a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Abdelrahman worked for the movement's

English website and created and managed several other websites including *ikhwanophobia.com*, which addresses the Muslim Brotherhood's relations with the Western world. He was arrested twice during Mubarak's regime, especially due to his activism for the campaign against military trials for civilians. He is currently working on the



project Tahrir Observatory which aims at monitoring the political and media discourses of different political players in Egypt and at emphasizing the values of the Tahrir revolution in these discourses.

#### **Amina Barketallah (TUNISIA)**



Amina Barketallah is an undergraduate student at the Mediterranean School of Business in Tunis. Prior, she earned the French baccalaureate (science section) with high honors in 2010 and studied biology for one year at the Institut National

des Sciences Appliquées et de la Technologie. Afterwards, she changed her vocation and decided to go to a business school. Her extra-curriculum activity in a youth debate club allowed Amina to participate in the USA-Tunisia Youth Debates on 22 March 2012 and in the Debate Boxing Day on 5 and 6 May 2012 (Young Arab Voices organized by the British Council). She also volunteered for the charity NGO Ayedi Arrahma.

#### **Naoual Belakhdar (ALGERIA/GERMANY)**



Naoual Belakhdar currently works as a research assistant at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, where she is focusing on the consequences of the Arab revolutions on Euro-Mediterranean relations. She studied political science at Free University Berlin and the Institut d'Études Politiques in Paris.

Her focus lies on political participation, social movements, and various forms of protest and resistance in Algeria, as well as on state-society relations and current transformation processes in the Middle East and North Africa.

#### **Wissem Boudriga (TUNISIA)**



Wissem Boudriga is pursuing an MA in English and international relations at the Higher Institute of Human Sciences in Tunis. In 2010 he earned his bachelor's degree from the same institute. Before, in 2007, he finished his baccalaureate

and also received the Arab music diploma. Wissem has been working with the British Council in Tunis as invigilator since 2010 and in 2008 he interned at the human

resources section of the Tunisian Enterprise for Petroleum Activities. Wissem also attended a training in community organizing and in observing elections, participated twice in the Tunisian International Model United Nations as delegate of Indonesia and Israel, and is co-founder and member of the International Relations Association Tunisia.

#### **Muttalip Çağlayan (TURKEY)**



Muttalip Çağlayan is currently pursuing his post-graduate studies at the Department of International Relations at the Middle East Technical University in Ankara, where he is also working as a research assistant. He obtained his bachelor's degree in political science and

international relations with a full tuition scholarship from Bahçeşehir University in 2008. Afterwards, he worked at the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), an influential think tank in Turkey, as an assistant to its democratization program, which prepares reports on Turkey's domestic and foreign policy issues. Muttalip's main research interests include Turkey's Kurdish question, Iraqi Kurds, Kurdish Nationalism, radical Islam, and global Islamic movements (in particular the Gülen movement in Turkey).

#### **Ouiem Chettaoui (TUNISIA)**



Ouiem Chettaoui is a student of international relations and a teacher of English literature at the Higher Institute of Human Sciences in Tunis (ISSHT). After having received her high school diploma from the International School of Choueifat, Abu Dhabi in 2006, she decided

to pursue her undergraduate studies in her country of origin, Tunisia, and studied English literature, language, and civilization at the Preparatory Institute for Human Sciences and Literary Studies Tunis (IPELSHT). In 2008 Ouiem succeeded in a competitive entrance exam for the École Normale Supérieure de Tunis (ENS) and in 2010 she received her maîtrise from the Faculty of Human Sciences. Alongside an active participation in the Tunisian protest movements of 2011, Ouiem passed the agrégation diploma upon which she received a teaching position from the Ministry of Higher Education. Having passed her first year in the international relations master's program with

great success, ranking first, she looks forward to specialising further in international relations and political science at the PhD level, keeping a special focus on North African politics and the region's socio-economic potential. Ouïem is a founding member of the International Relations Association Tunisia and a frequent guest and commentator on Tunis International Radio's English language program.

#### **Damla Cihangir (TURKEY)**



Damla Cihangir is a second year PhD student in political science at Sabancı University in Istanbul. She is also assistant for the project "Transworld: Redefining the Transatlantic Relationship and its Role in shaping Global Governance." She earned her BA degree in social and political science from Sabancı University and her first MA degree in European studies from King's College London with a Jean Monnet Scholarship of the European commission. She wrote her thesis on the role of the EU's regional policy on the Europeanization of candidate states. Damla received her second MA degree from the University of Athens in Southeast European studies with a thesis on the role of the Greek business community, civil society, and media in Turkey's EU accession process. She worked as a project assistant at ELIAMEP in Athens and as a junior researcher at the Economic Development Foundation (IKV) in Istanbul for two years. At IKV, she wrote several publications regarding the Turkish EU accession process, several policy areas of the EU, civil society etc. She also worked at the IKV Brussels office. Her interests are history, EU politics and governance, political parties, and democratization.

#### **Eugenio Dacrema (ITALY)**



Eugenio Dacrema is a research trainee at the Milan based think tank Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI) and a master student of international relations and development economics at the University of Bologna (Forlì branch). He obtained his BA in international relations at the University of Pavia. In 2009–10 Eugenio lived in Damascus for one year, where he studied Arabic language at the University of Damascus and worked as translator and analyst at the Damascus branch

of the Istituto per il Commercio Internazionale (ICE). Since 2009, Eugenio writes for the international relations E-magazine *Equilibri*. He focuses on the MENA countries and is especially interested in macroeconomic issues. In 2011 he worked in the Lombardia region's Springs5 project for international trade. Beyond *Equilibri*, he published in the financial E-magazine *FondiOnline*, the Spanish newspaper *El Confidencial*, the news agency *Inter Press Service*, the Arab E-magazine *Jadaliyya*, and the weekly bulletin on international relations of the Italian parliament. Currently, Eugenio is preparing his master thesis on the macroeconomic changes in the North African countries after the Arab uprisings.

#### **Naiera Ellethy (EGYPT)**



Naiera Ellethy is a student enrolled in the Euro-Med master's program at the Faculty of Economics and Political Sciences, Cairo University. She is currently working on her thesis on Islamic parties in the Southern Mediterranean. She also works as a program officer for the Alnakib

Center for Training & Democracy Support, an Egyptian NGO working on human rights advocacy and democracy support. Through this organization, Naiera participated in several election monitoring campaigns in Egypt and is also involved in different youth groups working on gender equality in Egypt. Naiera is also a member of the Egyptian Socialist Democratic Party.

#### **Sarah Elliott (AUSTRALIA/UK)**



Sarah Elliott is currently undertaking her master's degree in philosophy in international relations at Cambridge University. She grew up in Perth and was granted a bachelor's degree in law and history with first class honours from the University of Western Australia in

2008. She subsequently moved to Sydney to become an associate to the Hon Justice J.D. Heydon at the high court of Australia. That year, Sarah also pursued her interest in human rights by becoming convenor and secretary of Amnesty International's legal network in New South Wales and a member of the New South Wales Young Lawyers Human Rights Committee. After practice in refugee status determination following a brief stint as a corporate

lawyer, Sarah moved to Cambridge to pursue her MA. Through the Cambridge Centre for Governance and Human Rights, Sarah coordinated a research group to assist the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial and Summary Executions in preparing a report for the Human Rights Council on risks to the safety of journalists.

#### AbdElGhany ElSokary (EGYPT)



AbdElGhany ElSokary is project manager of the Danish Egyptian Dialogue Institute's Political Education Program and social media officer of the Thomson Reuters Foundation's Aswat Masriya. He is a recent graduate of the Faculty of Law and currently enrolled at Le Magistère de l'Institut de Droit des Affaires

Internationales à l'Université du Caire. AbdElGhany has been active in the field of enhancing political awareness and participation in Egypt before and after the January 25 uprising. He is the founder of a youth initiative called "The Movement for Political Awareness and Participation Enhancement" and additionally organized several political awareness programs at his university. AbdElGhany was the official delegate of Egypt at UNESCO's 7th Youth International Forum and he was elected to represent the MENA region in the drafting committee, which works on drafting the recommendations of the world's youths. He participated in several workshops of the biggest human rights centre in the Middle East, the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, and was in charge of organizing and facilitating the 17th student course on human rights.

#### Emma Ghariani (TUNISIA/FRANCE)



Emma Ghariani is a graduate from SciencesPo Paris, where she studied political science, economics, and humanities at the French-German College. During her studies, she spent one semester as an exchange student at Free University Berlin. With the Arab uprisings, she started focusing on this area and participat-

ed in the Fulbright European Student Leaders Program in 2011. This very decisive experience convinced her to take a gap year in order to witness the democratic transition in Tunisia. Accordingly, she worked from September 2011 to March 2012 for the French embassy's outpost in Sfax,

in the South of Tunisia. As a communication officer, she managed the restructuring of communication, developed the cultural cooperation with the awakening civil society, and organized training sessions for grass root NGOs. In order to be better embedded in the democratic transition, she worked at the same time as an accredited part-time correspondent for the newspaper Opinion Internationale. She attended meetings and interviewed politicians and citizens in the whole country, writing especially on issues concerning freedom of speech and press freedom. After gaining two years of professional experience in the region, Emma will pursue her MA studies at the School for Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University in Bologna.

#### Myriam Guetat (TUNISIA)



Myriam Guetat is a second year doctoral student researching on the topic "The Resistance of Cultural Identities to the Application of International Law: The Islamic Particularisms." At the same time, she is registered at the Tunisian Bar Association and is working as a trainee lawyer at a legal office

in Tunisia. Myriam earned her baccalauréat-art major in 2005 and then studied legal studies at the University of Juridical, Political, and Social Sciences of Tunis. After that, she was accepted at the Institut du Droit de la Paix et du Développement at the University of Nice Sophia Antipolis, where she earned her master's degree in international and European private and public law. Myriam is also very interested in associative work and has experiences as a workshop trainer for young students aiming at creating citizen associations and clubs.

#### Abderrahim Guzrou (MOROCCO)



Abderrahim Guzrou is a social scientist, linguist, and English teacher. He graduated from the University of al Akhawayn with an MA in international studies and diplomacy with a masters thesis on "A Comparative Study of the Electoral Systems in Morocco, Jordan, and Algeria" and obtained his BA in political science from Beloit College, Wisconsin in May 2008.

Moreover, he holds a bachelor's degree in English studies



from the University of Hassan II in addition to a certificate of teaching English as a second or foreign language (TESL) from Beloit College. During his two-year stay in the USA, Abderrahim interned at the office of Congresswoman Tammy Baldwin as well as the YMCA of Arlington, Virginia. Likewise, he completed a two-month internship at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation in Morocco and has currently finished his nine-month internship as a project assistant at the British Council in Rabat. Abderrahim also teaches business English at Sunderland University-SIST in Rabat.

#### Imane Helmy (EGYPT)



Imane Helmy is currently pursuing her master's degree in economics in international development at the American University in Cairo (AUC) and is working as a research assistant at the German University in Cairo (GUC), where she is involved in a project entitled "Poverty Alleviation through Micro-financial Product Development." In 2010 Imane graduated with highest honors from the German University in Cairo with a major in economics and innovation technology and received the Middle-East Award for Research in Development and Sustainability prized by Procter and Gamble Egypt for writing an outstanding bachelor thesis entitled "Microcredit as a Strategy for Poverty-Alleviation – Concept and Application to Egypt." Imane is a board member of the NGO Alashanek Ya Balady, which manages several projects aiming at economic and human development in various governorates in Egypt.

#### Rozan Ibrahim (EGYPT)



Rozan Ibrahim joined the Egyptian Ministry of International Cooperation as a researcher responsible for cooperation with EU institutions and the European Investment Bank in November 2010. Prior, she worked as a research assistant at the Macro Fiscal Policy Unit at the Ministry of Finance. Rozan graduated from the American University in Cairo with an MA in applied economics with a specialization in competitive strategy and valuation in June 2012 and a BA in economics with highest honors in June 2010. During her studies, she worked as a research


assistant and as a teaching assistant at the economics department at AUC. Moreover, she worked as a summer trainee at CIB's Banking Department and at the Customer Service Department of HSBC Egypt.

#### Emna Jebri (TUNISIA)



Emna Jebri currently pursues a BSc in business administration at the Mediterranean School of Business in Tunis. She is a founding member and secretary general of the LEO Club Call of Solidarity & Tolerance (COST) as well as a founding member of the Mediterranean School of Business' (MSB) Debating Club. She was also a member of the winning team of the competition "Entrepreneurs of the Future" organized by MSB. Since 2012, Emna is the external relationships manager at the Tunisian Center for Social Entrepreneurship and responsible for writing memorandums of understanding and meeting representatives of potential partners. As an intern at the Maghreb Enterprise Development Initiative (MEDI), a think tank based in Tunis which works on fostering entrepreneurship in the Maghreb region, Emna was responsible for mapping the entrepreneurial ecosystem and writing blog posts about research conducted in Tunisia. In addition to economic development, she is particularly interested in social entrepreneurship, which led her to participate in the Social Business Competition organized by the Tunisian Center for Social Entrepreneurship.

#### Elif Kalaycıoğlu (TURKEY)



Elif Kalaycıoğlu is a first-year PhD candidate in political science at Sabancı University in Istanbul. Her research interests are critical international relations, notions of political emancipation, and non-hegemonic approaches to politics and citizenship. She holds a BA in political science from Vassar College and a master's degree with distinction in European studies from the LSE, where she focused on European notions of belonging and citizenship and their impact on Turkish-EU relations. Prior to starting her PhD at Sabancı University, she worked for think tanks in Turkey and the UK, focusing on issues of human and minority rights. From 2010 to 2011, she worked as a producer for BBC World Service's Turkish



desk. Her work at BBC coincided with the first six months of the Arab Spring, leading her to take a close interest in the unfolding of the uprisings as well as the international response to and engagement with it.

#### Ute Kohler (GERMANY)



Ute Kohler is studying development studies (Mag.) and Arabic studies (BA) at the University of Vienna since 2007. During her studies abroad at the Middle East Studies Program of the American University in Cairo and the Arabic Department of INALCO in Paris she acquired

further knowledge of her regional research focus. She is currently preparing one of her final theses on the recruitment of women for active jihad with a focus on al-Qaeda. Her main interests are Middle Eastern politics and societies, the Arabic language and culture, migration and asylum in Europe, theories of development, and non-state actors in regional conflict areas. She volunteered at several organizations in the field of migration and refugees, such as the Austrian Red Cross in Vienna and France Terre d'Asile in Paris. At the University of Vienna she has also worked as a student tutor for a transdisciplinary development research seminar and as president of student representatives for Arabic studies. Ute was in Cairo during the Egyptian revolution, the event leaving her deeply impressed and intrigued about the countries' revolutionary potential. Since then, she has been following the transition period very closely.

#### Shaimaa Magued (EGYPT)



Shaimaa Magued has been a PhD candidate in international relations at SciencesPo Aix since 2009. She earned a master's degree in public policy and administration and in international relations from the American University in Cairo (AUC) and Sciences Po Paris respectively.

Moreover, she holds a BA in political science from the Faculty of Economics and Political Science at AUC and a French language diploma (DELF). Shaimaa interned at the French Institute of Anatolian Studies (IFEA) in Istanbul, the Arab League, the Arab National Security Sector, and the Economic, Political and Juridical Documentaries and Studies Center (CEDEJ). She has also published sev-

eral articles on Turkish foreign policy, Middle East politics, and political economy.

#### Miguel Mateos Muñoz (SPAIN)



Miguel Mateos Muñoz is a political scientist and journalist. He obtained his bachelor's and master's degree in communication studies at the Universidad Complutense in Madrid. During his studies, he spent one year at Ruhr University in Bochum in an Erasmus program

and one year at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, specializing in international relations. After obtaining his MA in international relations and diplomacy from the Escuela Diplomática in Spain, Miguel spent almost one year as a policy officer at the Spanish embassy in Lebanon. Sponsored by the autonomous regional government of Castile-La Mancha, he pursued his MA in European political and administrative studies at the College of Europe in Bruges with merits (*mention bien*). In order to deepen his knowledge of EU issues, he did a five months traineeship at VOICE, the main humanitarian NGO network in Brussels, in 2012. Miguel has been enrolled in an important record of courses about the Middle East and international relations in institutions such as the Euro-Arab Foundation of Higher Studies or Queens University of Belfast, writing on these topics in the blog PassimBlog.com, which he founded together with fellow colleagues.

#### Markus Mayr (GERMANY/BELGIUM)



Markus Mayr currently divides his time between his roles as researcher and executive assistant at the Brussels office of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) and as junior research fellow at Carnegie Europe. Previously, he was responsible for

the German team and the international research on civil society in a project developing information tools for UN stakeholders. Markus studied in Passau and Helsinki for his undergraduate degree in governance and public policy and holds a Master of Laws in international law and international relations from the University of Kent Law School. His graduate studies focused on international human rights and humanitarian and criminal law, while his current research addresses issues of transitional justice

as well as legal and political aspects of conflict management. During his studies, Markus supported Crisis Action Berlin's work on the conflicts in Somalia, DR Congo, and Sudan and was a research assistant in a project on public health policy at the University of Passau. In 2009 he interned at the DGAP's Alfred von Oppenheim Centre for European Policy Studies.


#### Regine Schwab (GERMANY)



Regine Schwab is currently pursuing her graduate studies in sociology and political science at Humboldt University in Berlin, with a focus on the MENA region. She is also a student assistant at the Department of Comparative Structural Analysis. Regine accomplished her

undergraduate studies in Berlin and Berkeley. During her studies in Berkeley, from 2010 to 2011, she started to focus on the Middle East and in particular on Egypt. Her research interests include religion and politics, state formation in the MENA region, civil society, social movements, political Islam, identity politics, gender, and Arab media. In Berkeley, Regine was a research assistant in the project "From Revolution to Regulation – Politics and Religion in Post-Revolutionary Iran," which focused on the changes within the Iranian religious field since the 1979 revolution. She wrote her bachelor thesis on the Egyptian revolution in 2011, using the framework of public sphere, performance, and social movements. Regine would like to return to Cairo to carry out research for her master's thesis, probably on women in the Islamist movement.

#### Mickaël Vogel (FRANCE)



Mickaël Vogel holds a BA from SciencesPo Paris, where he studied political science, international relations, and Middle Eastern studies. He is currently a prospective student at the London School of Economics (MSc international relations). He interned at the French

Institute for International Relations for more than six

months in the North Africa/Middle East program, where he participated in the organization of several international events on the international relations of the Middle East and the Arab awakening, while conducting research on several topics linked to North Africa and the Arab revolutions. Mickaël has completed a research internship at the Jacques Berques Center in Rabat last summer, at the end of which he published a paper on the democratization process of Morocco. He has lived for almost one year in Cairo in 2011–12, and is currently interning at *Jadaliyya* (e-zine) as a Maghreb page researcher and French editor. His interests focus on North African politics, transnational actors in North Africa, Islam in international relations, and the foreign policies of North African countries in sub-Saharan Africa.

#### Marwa Wasfy (EGYPT)



Marwa Wasfy is assistant lecturer of political science at Cairo University instructing courses on foreign policy and Western political systems. Previously, she worked as an economic researcher at the multinational corporation Bench Mark and as editor in various indepen-

dent magazines. Focusing in her thesis on the American foreign policy toward political Islam, including different case studies from Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Palestine, she earned her master's degree in international relations at Cairo University in 2007. Marwa's research interests range from American foreign policy and European studies to Middle Eastern studies and gender equality. Her BA graduation research focused on predicting the future of the international system. She has also conducted research on the liberal theory of democracy. Marwa has also participated in many conferences on youth and women empowerment organized by different academic institutions and NGOs engaged on both the national and the international level. Furthermore, she has recently received a scholarship to study one semester at Tübingen University in order to collect part of her MA data and has also been selected to participate in the last International Visitor Leaders Program organized by the American State Department.



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